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El uso de la fuerza armada contra el terrorismo internacional: 
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L’emploi de la force contre le terrorisme international: tout 
passe et rien ne demeure
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ABSTRACT: This article analyses the legality of international society’s reactions to terrorism with 
the use of force. It considers, in particular, the cases where States have interpreted the use of force 
prohibition and the right to self-defence extensively and whether international rules are evolving to 
permit more effective protection against the terrorist threat.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza la legalidad de las reacciones armadas de la sociedad internacio-
nal ante el terrorismo. Se valora, en particular, en qué casos los Estados han interpretado de manera 
extensiva la prohibición del uso de la fuerza y el derecho de legítima defensa y en qué medida las 
normas internacionales pueden estar evolucionando para permitir una respuesta más efectiva frente 
a la amenaza terrorista. 
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terrorisme. Il évalue, particulièrement, dans quels cas les États ont interprété d’une manière exten-
sive la prohibition de l’emploi de la force, le droit de légitime défense et si les normes internatio-
nales pourraient évoluer pour permettre un réponse plus effective face au terrorisme.
MOT CLÉ: Emploi de la force, terrorisme, légitime défense. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The prohibition on the use of  force, included in article 2.4 of  the Charter 
of  the United Nations, was conceived in 1945 as a solution to tackle State 
abuses and ensure international stability. More than seventy years later, the 
incursion of  new actors, and conflicts and threats of  an entirely different 
nature to those at that time have outgrown the Charter’s provisions.
The prohibition on the use of  force only allows for two exceptions: 
firstly, the Security Council may carry out armed actions in accordance with 
chapter VII of  the Charter, and with agreement from the majority of  its 
members (including, of  course, permanent members); secondly, the States 
may also do so, but only in the exercise of  their right to self-defence (article 
51). In this way, the Charter provides that States may only breach the article 
2.4 prohibition under very specific circumstances (self-defence), although the 
truth is that the boundaries have been overstepped on many occasions. Spe-
cifically, this has occurred when States have wanted to take a stand against 
international terrorism and considered that the collective security system the 
Security Council is responsible for did not ensure their security. Up to what 
point does current International Law allow a response to the international 
terrorism threat that uses force? Does its gravity justify a more flexible inter-
pretation of  the prohibition? Is it possible to allege self-defence as a response 
to terrorist attacks?
The following pages will address these questions, in an attempt to clarify 
what choices are permissible within the framework of  the current internatio-
nal legal system, the existing loopholes and the possibility that some of  the 
regulations are evolving to allow a better defence against terrorism.
II. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND THE INSURGENCE OF INTERNATIO-
NAL TERRORISM: FIRST RESPONSES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The main innovation in the Charter of  the United Nations was the prohi-
bition on the use or the threat of  use of  force under its article 2.4, which, as 
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the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) would classify it years later, is a “cor-
nerstone” of  the text 2. The General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), of  24 
October 1970, enshrined it as a legal principle and jurisprudence confirmed 
its customary nature3.
The Charter also arbitrated alternative mechanisms for protecting mem-
ber States which, under the new regulations, could not now react by using 
force. The Security Council has the monopoly on the use of  force, although 
the States may also exercise it, but only in individual or collective self-defence 
(article 51), in the event of  an armed attack occurring, and complying with 
strict requirements. In spite of  the prohibition, there have been many exam-
ples of  the use (and abuse) of  force (some of  which invoked, specifically, the 
fight against international terrorism) – the NATO attack on Kosovo (1999), 
justified on humanitarian grounds; the war in Afghanistan (2001-2002), jus-
tified as self-defence against the attacks against the United States on 11 Sep-
tember 2001; the Iraq war (2003), started due to the possession of  weapons 
of  mass destruction4; Russia’s actions in Georgia (Abkhazia, 1992, 1998, 2008 
and South Ossetia, 2008) and in Ukraine (2014-2015) supporting pro-Russian 
movements and alleging protection of  its nationals; the Lebanon war (2006) 
and Gaza (2008-2009) where Israel also invoked self-defence; the Internatio-
nal coalition bombings in the fight against Da’esh in Syria and Libya (2014-
2015); the intervention of  Saudi Arabia, at the head of  several Arabian states, 
in the Yemen (2015); Turkey’s intervention, alleging self-defence against the 
threat of  the PKK terrorist group in the Syrian region of  Afrin (January 
2018); and the Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syrian territory (May 2018).
The terrorist phenomenon has, above all during the last few years, be-
come one of  the main threats to peace and security in international society. 
2 Case concerning armed activities on the territory of  the Congo (Democratic Republic of  
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of  19 December 2005, p. 223, para. 148.
3 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of  America), Judgment of  27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 (paras. 188 y 
190). 
4 Later not proven, as confirmed on 6 July 2016 by the so-called Chilcot Report on the UK’s part 
in the Iraq war. This was drawn up at the request of  the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in 
2009 (Report of  the Iraq Inquiry, section 4, Iraq’s weapons of  mass destruction, pp. 604-611, available 
at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/).
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On the sidelines of  the international treaties5 and other initiatives which have 
been mediated to deal with it, and which are not the subject of  this article, 
the Security Council has taken a prominent role in their control.6 Its activity 
intensified after the Al Qaeda attacks on the USA (2001) and, since then, it 
has passed a high number of  resolutions with sanctions which are specifically 
aimed at castigating and preventing terrorism, with the support of  the Coun-
ter-Terrorism Committee, which was formed by resolution 1373 (2001). The 
incursion of  Da’esh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State) in 2014, forced it to 
intensify its activity in the fight against terrorism and impose new measures, 
the majority of  which were on the same lines as those already in force against 
other terrorist organisations, but some of  which were more specific in the 
light of  the new features of  the one appearing.7
The majority of  these resolutions contained measures which did not in-
volve the use of  force, but some of  them (resolution 1373 [2015] and, above 
all, resolution 2249 [2015] against the Islamic State) have been particular-
ly controversial. Not one of  them expressly and clearly approved the use 
of  force against international terrorism, but, instead, opted (in some cases 
more controversial than others, as we shall see) to include vague references 
to self-defence or backing up actions taken by the States on the basis of  exer-
5 Although those treaties are numerous (nineteen, twelve of  which were prior to 2001), a 
general international treaty, which may be considered a mandatory legal framework, does not 
exist (in spite of  the fact that the General Assembly continues to insist on the matter, see A/
RES/72/123, 18 December 2017 About those treaties effectiveness, see SalinaS de FríaS, 
A. M., “Lucha contra el terrorismo internacional: no sólo del uso de la fuerza pueden vivir 
los Estados”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 68,2, 2016, pp. 229-252; p. 233). 
6 On the measures adopted by the Organisation against terrorism, see Blanc altemir, A., 
“La respuesta de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas al terrorismo internacional”, 
Gutiérrez eSpada, C. (dir.) and cervell Hortal, Mª. J. (coord.), Derecho Internacional, Alianza 
de Civilizaciones y terrorismo global, Diego Marín Librero Editor, 2011, pp. 49-90 (for the General 
Assembly measures, see pp. 58-73 and for the Council’s, pp. 73-89). See also díaz Barrado, 
C. M., “El marco jurídico internacional de la lucha contra el terrorismo”, in Lucha contra 
el terrorismo y Derecho Internacional, Grupo de Trabajo nº 6/04, Cuadernos de Estrategia, vol. 133, 
Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, pp. 51-77 (pp. 63-68).
7 Fundamentally, measures for financial control and controlling foreign fighters (for these 
issues, see cervell Hortal, Mª. J.,“El Derecho Internacional: ¿una herramienta eficaz en la 
lucha contra el Daesh?”, en Cervell Hortal, Mª. J. (dir.), Estado Islámico, Naciones Unidas, Dere-
cho Internacional y Unión Europea, Comares, 2017, pp. 37-96 (pp. 42-57).
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cising that right, because the conditions traditionally demanded to do so did 
not occur.
III. THE USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM:  
IS THIS CONCEPT TOO RIGID?
The failure of  the collective security system, practically from the first 
days of  the United Nations Organisation, meant that the States, which were 
not protected by a Security Council that was blocked by the right of  veto, 
were tempted to resort to the form of  self-defence provided for in article 51 
of  the Charter far more than was planned. The appearance of  new players 
in international society, in which rebel groups or terrorist movements made 
space for themselves, and the change in the nature of  the conflicts, also fed 
broader interpretations.
In fact, today, self-defence is considered to be acceptable not just in the 
face of  armed attacks as they were understood to be when the Charter was 
drawn up (mainly State A army invades or attacks State B territory), but also 
in the face of  indirect armed aggression, staged by irregular groups directly 
sent or controlled by a State. The ICJ expressly accepted this in the Nicaragua 
case, although it showed itself  to be more reluctant to do so given minor uses 
of  force which were not equivalent to an armed attack.8
More problems pose other questions which are still not clearly answered 
today, specifically, the exercise of  the right to self-defence against non-state 
actors or the reaction to unfulfilled attacks. These are not contemplated in 
the Charter, but some States see them as the only way out, to solve problems 
arising in present-day international society, even if  this involves transgressing 
the traditional parameters for the right of  self-defense and the prohibition of  
the use of  force in more cases than were originally envisaged.9 Although it is 
8 Later cases would qualify what was meant by minor uses of  force (Case concerning oil 
platforms (Islamic Republic of  Iran v. United States of  America), Judgment of  6 November 
2003, ICJ Reports 2003, para. 64 and Case concerning armed activities on the territory of  the 
Congo... cit., note 2, paras. 146 y 147. 
9 Although terrorism has boosted this possibility, it is not new. Many years ago (1970) 
Thomas Franck asked who had killed article 2.4 of  the Charter (“Who killed article 2(4)? or: 
changing norms governing the use of  force by States”, American Journal of  International Law, 
vol. 64, 5, 1970, pp. 809-837), sustaining that the prohibition on the use of  force depended 
on the collective security system functioning and that, in as far as this did not function, the 
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true that, on some occasions, their reasoning has been capricious and difficult 
to justify, on others, they simply sought to meet needs which did not exist in 
1945.
The right to self-defence in accordance with a strict interpretation of  the 
Charter, is only possible when an armed attack occurs, it is of  sufficient size 
and it comes from a State (either acting directly or with others that it has a 
clear link with). The Charter also imposes an additional obligation – imme-
diate reporting of  the measures taken to the Security Council which, accor-
ding to the wording of  article 51, should then take charge of  the actions to 
keep international peace and security. However, the right to self-defence also 
needs other conditions for it to be correctly exercised: immediacy of  respon-
se, need and proportionality, all of  which are absent from the Charter, but the 
requirement for which has been endorsed by jurisprudence. The former is 
the consolidated, legal content in force, although perhaps it is not in line with 
present-day reality, in as far as its rigidity does not always ensure that those 
attacked are able to react in a suitable manner.
The Al-Qaeda attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 
marked, without doubt, a before and after in the fight against terrorism. On 
12 September the Security Council passed resolution 1368 (2001), classifying 
the terrorist acts “as a threat to international peace and security”, while also 
expressing their willingness to take “all necessary steps to respond”. Howe-
ver, it did not confirm that an armed attack had occurred and the references 
to self-defence are limited to a mere recognition in the Preamble of  the exis-
tence of  the right under the Charter of  the United Nations. Resolution 1373 
(2001), passed some days later (28 September), which adopted a considerable 
number of  sanctions to cut terrorist groups’ financing and support off  at 
the roots, did not include any measure involving the use of  force either, and 
references to self-defence were as scarce as in resolution 1368 (2001).
A few days later, the United States attacked Al Qaeda training camps and 
military facilities in Afghanistan, informing the Council that it had “initia-
ted actions in the exercise of  its inherent right of  individual and collective 
need to continue to be bound by it was questionable. The argument was hazardous, because 
advocating that a regulation is no longer in force simply because those who should ensure 
its performance are incapable of  doing so seems to be going too far and, in fact, criticism 
was not long in coming (Henkin, L., “The reports of  the death of  article 2 (4) are greatly 
exaggerated”, American Journal of  International Law, vol. 65, 3, 1971, pp. 544-548). 
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self-defence following the armed attacks that were carried out against the 
United States on 11 September”10. Nevertheless, the attacks did not originate 
in a State (the links of  the terrorist organisation with Afghanistan had not 
been proven), the attacks did not fit into the description of  armed attack 
included in the 1974 resolution 3314 (XXIV) nor, at any event, did they fulfil 
the requirements for necessity and proportionality.11
Self-defence began to become a perfectly valid argument, at least for some 
States, in the fight against terrorism. The actions which, as we shall see, were 
taken years later against Da’esh have confirmed this. Two main problems 
10 Doc. S/2001/946 and 2001/947.
11 Authors, in fact, expressed opinions on the matter with zeal. The Spanish were particularly 
critical of  the war in Afghanistan. In this respect, see, calducH cervera, R., “La incidencia 
de los atentados del 11 de septiembre en el terrorismo internacional”, Revista Española de 
Derecho Internacional, vol. 53, 1 y 2, 2001, pp. 173-204; González veGa, J. A., “Los atentados 
del 11 de septiembre, la operación Libertad duradera y el derecho de legítima defensa”, 
Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 53, 1 y 2, 2001, pp. 247-272; Gutiérrez eSpada, 
C., “¿No cesaréis de citarnos leyes viendo que ceñimos espada? A propósito del 11 S”, 
Anuario de Derecho Internacional, vol. 17, 2001, pp. 25-38 and, by the same author, “El uso de la 
fuerza en los Informes del Grupo de Alto Nivel (2004), del Secretario General (2005) y, a la 
postre, en el Documento final de la Cumbre de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno”, Anuario de 
Derecho Internacional, vol. XXI, pp. 13-50 (pp. 32-33); ramón cHornet, C., “La lucha contra 
el terrorismo internacional después del 11 de septiembre de 2001”, Revista Española de Derecho 
Internacional, vol. 53, 1, 2001, pp. 273-288; remiro BrotónS, A., “Terrorismo, mantenimiento 
de la paz y nuevo orden”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 53, 1, 2001, pp. 125-171. 
Taking the opposite line, Bermejo García, R., “El Derecho Internacional frente al terrorismo: 
¿nuevas perspectivas tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre?”, Anuario de Derecho Internacional, 
vol. 17, 2001, pp. 5-24. The Spanish were not the only ones opposing the American reaction: 
condorelli, L., “Les attentats du 11 Septembre et leurs suites: où va le Droit International”, 
Revue Génerale de Droit International Public, 2001, pp. 829-848; corten, O. and duBuiSSon, 
F.,“Opération liberté inmuable: una extensión abusive du concept de légitime défense”, Revue 
Génerale de Droit International Public, 2002, pp. 51-78; corn, G. S., “Legal basis for the use of  
armed force”, in corn, G. S.; ScHoettler, j. a.; Brenner-Beck, d; HanSen, v. m.; dick 
jackSon, r. B.; talBot jenSen, e. y lewiS, m. w., The war on terror and the law of  war. A military 
perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, pp.1-33 (pp. 10-11). myjer, E. P. J. y 
wHite, D., “The twin towers attack: an unlimited right to self-defence”, Journal of  Conflict and 
Security Law, 2002, 7, 1, pp. 5-17 (p. 7) , were more understanding of  the American posture, 
although critical of  the Security Council, whose inaction, according to these authors, was 
what provoke the United States to act. iovane, M. y de vittor, F., “La doctrine européenne 
et l’intervention en Iraq”, Annuaire Français de Droit International, vol. XLIX, 2003, pp. 3-16, 
gives a general overview of  the European doctrine. 
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arise when it comes to accepting this new trend: firstly, if, traditionally, armed 
attack emanates from a State, whether it is possible to consider that an attack 
emanating from a group that has no links to any State as a detonator to self  
defence; and secondly, whether the arguments defended by some States for 
reacting in self-defence to terrorist attacks which have still not been carried 
out are admissible. We will deal with these questions in the following sections.
1. ARMED ATTACK AND NON-STATE ACTORS
The first condition on a State so that it may use the force is that a previous 
armed attack exists. This follows from article 51 and has also been confirmed 
by the International Court of  Justice.12 The Charter of  the United National 
does not expressly envisage that this attack must be exclusively originated in 
a State, but as the self-defence right was conceived as an exception to article 
2.4, which prohibits the use of  force on the States, it was thought that only 
them were affected by article 51.
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), of  14 December 1974, includes a Definition of  
Aggression, article 3 of  which is the mandatory reference when determining 
the existence of  an attack.13 Its sub-paragraphs include acts (direct invasion, 
bombardment, blockade of  the ports by another State (paragraphs a-f)) and 
also (paragraph g) acts committed by irregular groups, armed bands or mer-
cenaries, as long as they are sent by or acting on behalf  of  a State and are of  
equal gravity.
The resolution is, ultimately, based on a traditional concept of  attack, in 
which the State is present in some way14 and where it is necessary that such 
force takes a certain form. However, the fundamental scenario this resolution 
12 Nicaragua case (1986), op. cit., note 3, p. 103, para. 195; Case concerning oil platforms (Is-
lamic Republic of  Iran v. United States of  America), op. cit., note 8, pp. 186-187; Case on legal 
consequences of  the construction of  a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, Advisory 
Opinion of  9 July 2004,ICJ Reports 2004, p. 194 and Case concerning armed activities on the 
territory of  the Congo, op. cit., note 2, pp. 222-223 (although the latter simply presumed the 
existence of  an armed attack, for which reason its reflections on the matter are minor).
13 The ICJ itself  has always referred to this resolution when it comes to determining the 
existence, or not, of  an armed attack (see, for example, Nicaragua Case, op. cit., note 3, pp. 
103-104, para. 195 or Armed activities on the territory of  the Congo case, op. cit., note 2, p. 
223, para. 146).
14 This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Case about the legal consequences of  the construc-
tion of  a wall in Palestine, op. cit. note 12, para. 139.
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was based on is not the same today, and its content seems insufficient when 
it comes to terrorist actions which, due to their gravity, could be considered 
to be armed attacks, but where there is not always a direct link to any State.
The decisive moment when the validity of  the traditional concept of  
self-defence began to be questioned was, as noted, in 2001, after the Al-Qae-
da attacks on American targets. The United States became its most staunch 
defender, although other States15 and also some authors began to appear 
more open to the possibility.16 It is true that previously some had already 
15 Regarding the USA, see the US National Security Strategies, 2002 (p. 5), 2006 (p. 8), 2010 
(p. 20) and 2015 (p. 7), available at <http://nssarchive.us/>. The US also declared that, 
“The inherent right of  self-defense is not restricted to threats posed by States” (Report on the 
legal and policy frameworks guiding the United States’ use of  military force and related national security 
operations, December 2016, <https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
framework.Report_Final.pdf>, p. 9).
16 Amongst others, BetHleHem, d., “Self-defence against an imminent or actual armed 
attack by nonstate actors”, American Journal of  International Law, vol. 106, 2012, no. 4, pp. 
769-777;Bermejo García, r., op. cit., note 11, pp. 23 and 24 and, by the same author, “La 
legítima defensa y el Derecho Internacional en los albores del siglo XXI”, Los nuevos escenarios 
internacionales y europeos del Derecho y la Seguridad, Colección Escuela Diplomática, 2003, no 7, 
Madrid, pp. 127-141, p. 138 and “La paz y seguridad internacionales en el sistema de Naciones 
Unidas: algunas reflexiones en torno al uso de la fuerza y evolución en su septuagésimo 
aniversario”, in ponS raFolS, X., Las Naciones Unidas desde España, 70 Aniversario de las Naciones 
Unidas, 60 Aniversario del ingreso de España en las Naciones Unidas, Barcelona, anue, 2015, pp. 
169-192; caSSeSe, a., “Article 51”, in cot, j. p.; pellet, w. y Forteau, m (dirs.), La Charte des 
Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article, Paris, Economica, 3rd ed., 2005, pp. 1329-1360, 
p. 1352 (qualifies if  they are massive attacks of  considerable gravity); dinStein, y., War, 
aggression and self-defence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 4ª ed., 2005, pp. 204-208; 
Franck, t. m., “Terrorism and the right of  self-defense”, American Journal of  International 
Law, vol. 95, 2001, pp. 839-843, p. 840; Gutiérrez eSpada, c., “Sobre la prohibición del 
uso de la fuerza armada en los últimos sesenta años (1945-2015), in ponS raFolS, X., Las 
Naciones Unidas desde España, 70 Aniversario de las Naciones Unidas, 60 Aniversario del ingreso de 
España en las Naciones Unidas, Barcelona, Asociación para las Naciones Unidas en España 
(ANUE), 2015, pp. 125-150, pp. 138-139; kretzmer, d., “The inherent right to self-defence 
and proportionality in Jus ad bellum”, European Journal of  International Law, vol. 24, 2013, 
no. 1, pp. 235-282, pp. 246-250; murpHy, S., “Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory 
Opinion: an ipse dixit from the ICJ?”,American Journal of  International law, Vol. 99, 2005, no. 1, 
pp. 62-76;ÍD., “Terrorism and the concept of  armed attack in article 51 of  the UN Charter”, 
Harvard Journal of  International Law, Vol. 43, 2002, no. 1, pp. 42-51, p. 51 y randelzHoFer, 
a., “Article 51”, in Simma, B.; moSler, H.; randelzHoFer, a.; tomuScHat, c. y wolFrum, r. 
(eds.): The Charter of  the United Nations. A commentary, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 2002, Oxford, Oxford 
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attempted to justify the use of  the force they had used against certain armed 
groups acting outside their borders and whose connections with other States 
were non-existent (or, at least, unclear), but these were isolated situations 
which, in the majority of  cases, gave rise to fierce condemnation.17
In 2007, the IDI (Institut de Droit International) accepted the activa-
tion of  article 51 given an armed attack by a non-state actor, but only where 
this attack was launched “from space outside the jurisdiction of  any State”18, 
which clearly limited the possibilities of  exercising the right. Furthermore, 
a few years later, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law applicable to cyber 
warfare (2013, 2017) was clearer, taking as read the acceptance of  self-defence 
against non-state actors, supporting its confirmation in the fact that article 
51 did not, either in theory or in practice, prevent it and setting the date the 
Al-Qaeda attacks were launched against the United States and the subsequent 
Security Council resolutions (1368 and 1373)19 as its start. In 2016 the Inter-
national Law Association (ILA) accepted (although it acknowledged that this 
was not unanimous), “a growing recognition - including state practice - that 
there are certain circumstances in which a state may have a right of  self-de-
fence against non-state actors operating extraterritorially”20.
University Press, pp. 788-806, p. 802 and tamS, c. j., “The use of  force against terrorists”, 
European Journal of  International Law, vol. 20, 2009, no. 2, pp. 359-397.
17 Hence, India against Pakistani groups (1948), Morocco against the Polisario Front (end 
of  the 70’s); Israel repeatedly (plane hijack in Entebbe in 1976, bombing PLO barracks in 
Tunisia in 1985 or the incursions into the Lebanon in 1978 and 1982) or the United States 
(to attack Libya in 1986 invoking the attacks on American citizens (explosion of  a device in 
the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, doc. S/17990, 14 April 1986) and Iraq in 1993 (after the 
assassination attempt on President Bush, doc. S/PV.3245, 27 June 1993), and in response to 
the Al Qaeda attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (vid. doc 
S/1998/780, 20 August 1998). In this regard, pozo Serrano, P. “La legítima defensa frente a 
actores no estatales a la luz de la práctica del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas”, 
Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional, vol. 24, 2018, pp. 481-498 (pp. 485-486).
18 Resolution of  27 October 2007 (10éme Commission: Problèmes actuels du recours à la 
force en Droit International. A. Légitime défense), para. 10.
19 Tallinn Manual on the International Law applicable to cyber warfare, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 58-59, para. 16, norm 13 and Tallinn Man-
ual 2.0 on the International Law applicable to cyber operations, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2017, p. 345, para. 18, norm 18.
20 ILA, Report on Aggression and the Use of  Force, International Law Association, Johannesburg 
Conference, 2016, p. 11. 
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The possibility of  admitting self-defence against non-state actors was, 
therefore opened up, although it did so little by little.21 The incursion of  
Da’esh onto the international stage further fuelled the possibility of  arguing 
self-defence against terrorism. After Iraq asked the Security Council for help 
in September 2014, due to the terrorist organisation’s acts in its territory, the 
United States responded alleging, expressly, in order to justify its interven-
tion, (collective) self-defence against the continued threat of  Islamic State at-
tacks in Iraq. But it also reserved its right to act in Syria, as it understood that 
a large part of  the attacks from the group came from there. Self-defence was, 
therefore, forced to the maximum. It was used, with no problems, against 
non-state actors, but also to attack the territory of  a State - Syria – which, 
unlike Iraq, had not requested any help, nor had it consented to any action 
being taken (see the following paragraph).
On 20 November 2015, the Security Council passed resolution 2249, pa-
ragraph 5 of  which exhorts all member States, “that have the capacity to do 
so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in par-
ticular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, 
refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of  ISIL also 
known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq”. The question is whether this consisted 
of  approval of  the actions against Da’esh by the International Coalition, and 
recognition that it welcomed the arguments of  self-defence, not just in Iraq, 
but also in Syria. The resolution was not passed in accordance with chapter 
VII of  the Charter, as it should have been, but various States seized on it to 
back up and legitimise their arguments for self-defence in the fight against 
21 It should also be admitted that some authors have been seen to be very cautious about 
the possibility, on the understanding that it is still not possible to talk about a true opinio iuris 
which would permit it. antonopouloS, C., “Force by armed groups as armed attack and the 
broadening of  self-defence”, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 55, 2008, pp. 159-180, 
p. 18); ByerS, M., “Terrorism, the use of  force and International Law after 11 September”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 51, 2, 2002, pp. 401-414, p. 411: “…there 
is relatively little support for a right of  anticipatory self-defence, as such, in present day 
customary international law –either generally or in respect of  terrorist acts”; cHarney, J. I., 
“The use of  force against terrorism and International Law”, American Journal of  International 
Law, vol 95, 4, 2001, pp- 835-839; duBuiSSon, F., “La guerre du Liban de l’été 2006 et le droit 
de légitime défense”, Revue Belge de Droit International, vol 39, 2, 2006, pp. 529-564, p. 562-563 
or enaBulele, A.O., “Use of  force by international/regional non-state actors: no armed 
attack, no self-defence”, European Journal of  Law Reform, vol. 12, 2010, pp. 209-229, p. 216.
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Da’esh’s terrorism. This was the case of  Egypt, which defended it after the 
decapitation of  several of  its subjects (February 2015); in Russian, after an 
air crash over the Sinai Peninsula on 8 October 2015 with several Russians 
on board; in France, which began to justify its actions, not by the collective 
self-defence in favour of  Iraq, but individually, due to the attacks suffered in 
Paris22, or the United Kingdom, or Germany23. Even the European Union 
invoked the mutual defence clause in article 42.7 of  the Treaty of  the Eu-
ropean Union (“If  a Member State is the victim of  armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of  aid 
and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 
of  the United Nations Charter”) after the Paris attacks24.
It may be an exaggeration to assert that resolution 2249 (2015) can, on 
its own, justify an extension of  the concept of  self-defence to encompass 
non-state actors, but the truth is that is seems that some States are starting 
to have a clear idea that self-defence is a perfectly valid argument against 
non-state actors.
2. THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST A STATE  
WHICH DOES NOT CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF A TERRORIST MOVEMENT
The argument that it is also possible to exercise the right to self-defence 
against attacks from terrorist groups has also gone further, with some su-
pporting the possibility that a State may also use force in another’s territory, 
without their consent, if  the latter is incapable of, or does not wish to, putting 
a stop to the terrorist groups operating from it. This is what is known as the 
22 See alaBrune, F., “Fondements juridiques de l’intervention militaire française contre 
Daech en Irak et en Syrie”, Revue Générale de Droit International Publique, vol. 120, 1, 2016, pp. 
41-50. Also see Frances’s declarations in the Security Council meeting that passed the reso-
lution: doc. S/PV.7565, 20 November 2015. 
23 Doc. S/PV.7565, 20 November 2015, p. 9 and doc. S/2015928, respectively.
24 Outcome of  the Council Meeting 3426th, Council Meeting Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 16 and 17 
November 2015, doc. 14120/15 (OR. en) PRESSE 69 PR CO 61.On the article’s mechanism, 
GoutteFarde, F., “L’invocation de l’article 42.7 TUE ou la solidarité militaire europeenne a 
l’épreuve de la guerre contre le terrorisme”, Revue Générale de Droit International Publique, vol. 
120, 2016, no. 1, pp. 51-67 y González alonSo, l. n., “¿Daños jurídicos colaterales? La 
invocación del artículo 42.7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea y la lucha contra el terrorismo 
internacional”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, vol. 32, 2016, pp. 1-23 and piernaS 
lópez, J. J., Respuestas normativas de la Unión Europea a la amenaza del Estado Islámico (Daesh), 
Comares, Granada, 2018, pp. 205-233.
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unwilling or unable to act theory. Its main argument turns on the idea that every 
State is ultimately responsible for controlling its territory and preventing acts 
of  terrorism against others occurring or being organised within it or from it, 
in such a way that, if  it does not do so, the victim State may replace it in the 
role and take direct action (including armed) against the terrorist groups.
This theory was precisely the basis used by the United States to justify its 
attacks in Syria, in 2014, to halt Da’esh.25 In fact, it has, from the beginning, 
been linked to the terrorist phenomenon26 and other States have also inter-
mittently resorted to it to justify armed action in others’ territory: Turkey in 
its incursions into northern Iraq against Kurdish terrorists in 1996;27 Russia, 
when attacking Chechen bases in Georgia in 2002;28 Israel in its incursions 
into the Lebanon against Hezbollah in 2006;29 Colombia, when invading 
Ecuador in pursuit of  FARC rebels in 2008;30 and Kenya in its incursions 
into Somalia in 2011.31
25 The letter sent to the Secretary General and the President of  the Security Council on 23 
September 2014, clearly stated that ” States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance 
with the inherent right of  individual and collective self-defence, as reflected in Article 51 of  
the Charter of  the United Nations, when, as is the case here, the government of  the State 
where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of  its territory for such attacks”, 
doc. S/2014/695, 23 September 2014.
26 In particular, the inactivity of  the Ugandan government was one of  the arguments raised 
by Israel, in 1976, to invade its territory to free the passengers (Israelis) of  an aeroplane 
hijacked by Palestinian terrorists, doc. S/PV.1939, 9 July 1976. The Israeli representative de-
nounced the lack of  security at the airport (para. 70) and the collaboration of  the Ugandan 
authorities with the terrorists, defending the action with the inherent right to self-defence 
(para. 101).
27 Doc. S/1996/479, 2 July 1996. On the matter, ruyS, T., “Quo vadit jus ad bellum? A legal 
analysis of  Turkey’s military operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq”, Melbourne Journal 
of  International Law, vol. 9, 2008, no. 2, pp. 334-364.
28 Doc. S/2002/1012, 12 September 2002 (Letter from the Russian Representative) and the 
response from Georgia (doc. S/2002/1035, 16 September).
29 Israel alleged, in fact, that it was responding to “an act of  war” and many States supported 
it (doc. S/PV. 5489, 14 July 2006, p. 6).
30 Colombia expressly alleged self-defence (see doc. S/2008/146), although Ecuador and 
Venezuela talked about aggression to classify Colombia’s action. The OAS condemned the 
action (doc. CP/Res 930 [1631/08], 5 March 2008), but the United States supported it. 
31 luBell, n., Extraterritorial use of  force against non state actors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010, pp. 31 et seq, and trapp, k. n., “Back to basics: necessity, proportionality, and the right 
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The theory, even though it has been presented as having a clear objective 
(defence against terrorist groups acting from another State’s territory without 
any control), raises numerous misgivings of  a legal nature. Ultimately, howe-
ver much it is alleged that the use of  force is not against the State itself, but 
that it is undertaken in its territory, article 2.4 is being contravened and it terri-
torial integrity breached. This does not seem to have mattered to the US go-
vernment, which has shown itself  to be a staunch defender of  the argument. 
The December 2016 Report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the United 
States’ use of  military force and related national security operations, which describes 
the guidelines followed by the Obama Administration when it came to using 
force outside US borders, directly embraced it32 and not just in relation to 
acting against Da’esh but also as a general rule. The National Security Strategy, 
adopted in December 2017 under the Trump Administration, openly decla-
res that the United States will take direct action against terrorists threatening 
American interests “regardless of  where they are”33. Nonetheless, to date, its 
acceptance has been rather limited34 and it would appear that, at least for the 
moment, only Da’esh and the gravity of  its actions have led to the theory ca-
rrying more weight than it had up until now. We cannot, therefore, talk about 
a clear opinio iuris ready to enshrine it. What is more, the States’ support for 
it has mainly taken place within the context of  the war against Da’esh, that 
is to say, in an unprecedented situation with specific features that just about 
became more understandable with it. The ICJ, however, has rejected actions 
of  this type in the past, when it refused to admit that, in the case concerning 
armed activities on the territory of  the Congo, that the lack of  action by the Congo-
of  self-defence against non-state terrorist actors”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
vol. 56, 2007, no. 1, pp. 141-156.
32 Op. cit., note 15, pp. 9 and 10. This states that, “In some cases, International Law does not 
require a State to obtain consent from the State on whose territory force will be used against 
a non-state armed group […]”, because the States must defend themselves if  “the govern-
ment of  the State where the threat is located is unable or unwilling to prevent the use of  its 
territory by a non-state actor for such attacks”. 
33 National Security Strategy, December 2017, p. 11 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
34 Only 3 other States (Canada, Australia and Turkey) have expressly mentioned it (see 
cervell Hortal, M. J., “Sobre la doctrina unwilling or unable State (¿podría el fin justificar 
los medios?)”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 70, 1, 2018, pp. 77-100, pp. 91 and 
92).
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lese Government was equivalent to tolerating or consenting to the activities 
of  the groups acting in its territory.35 It should also be noted that, in 2016, 
the ICJ now, as we know, admitted self-defence against non-state actors, but 
showed its preoccupation with the possibility of  going further and qualified 
that where non-state groups operate within the borders of  a State, “the vic-
tim state may have a right to self-defence against the armed group, but not 
against the state”. Therefore, the attack must be finely tuned so that it does 
not affect the State’s governmental and/or national institutions in any way 
whatsoever, because, otherwise, article 2.4 of  the Charter would, in effect, 
be breached.36 Therefore, it would appear that there are numerous arguments 
against the theory, which takes self-defence against non-state actors to extre-
mes and which, at any event, would appear to be made-to-measure for the 
specific situation in Syria with Da’esh.37 Generalising it for future situations 
would, at least for the moment, lack any solid legal basis.
3. SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORIST “THREATS”
Preventive self-defence is one of  the matters that has sparked the most 
debate about this legal form. Even since the Charter was passed, the doctrine 
35 See paras.. 276, 301 and 303 of  the judgment. In this regard, Gutiérrez eSpada, c. and 
cervell Hortal, m. j., “La prohibición del uso de la fuerza en la sentencia de la CIJ de 
19 de diciembre de 2005 (asunto sobre las actividades armadas en el territorio del Congo, 
República Democrática del Congo c. Uganda)”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 
58, 2006, no. 1, pp. 239-256, p. 25. 
36 ILA, Report on Aggression and the Use of  Force, International Law Association, op. cit. note 
21, pp. 12 and 13.These measures should be “proportionate and be limited to those strictly 
necessary in the context of  self-defence against the non-state actor” (p. 12).
37 Even the most critical have acknowledged it. The ILA states as follows, “The military oper-
ations on Syrian territory against the so-called Islamic State have, in particular, demonstrated 
the readiness of  a number of  states to invoke Article 51 in the context of  operations against 
a non-state actor” (p. 11). On the other hand, it seems to me that the statement that although 
we cannot talk about the inability or unwillingness to act theory as customary, we can say that 
the events in Syria can be classfieid as a catalyst which has fed it, is rather reckless (FlaScH, 
o., “The exercise of  self-defence against ISIL in Syria: new insights on the extraterritorial use 
of  force against non-state actors”, Journal on the use of  force and International Law, vol. 3, 2016, 
no. 1, pp. 37-69, p. 64). 
The Use of  Force Against International Terrorism: Everything Changes, Nothing Remains Still
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 6, janvier-décembre 2018, pp. 47-65
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.03
62
has been divided on the matter38, but the restrictionist39 posture was in the ma-
jority, backed up, as we shall see, by ICJ jurisprudence, which was also based 
on a literal interpretation of  article 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of  individual or collective self-defence, if  an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of  the United Nations....” (italics added)) to 
argue that self-defence was only permitted against actual (consummated) attacks.
Once again the terrorist phenomenon has fanned debate, as the States 
have advocated self-defence against attacks emanating from terrorist groups 
even in cases where they have not taken place. Once more, the 11-S attack 
marked an inflection point. Although the United States went to extremes to 
defend self-defence in the matter, including “latent” threats, the United Na-
tions has been more cautious. The 2004 Report by the High Level Group de-
fended that self-defence against imminent attack, although controversial, could 
be considered to be a “principle of  International Law” 40. The following year, 
the Report by the Secretary General, “In larger freedom. Towards develo-
38 The so-called expansionists defended themselves with various arguments: the actual word-
ing of  article 51, confirming that “nothing in the present Charter will impair the inherent 
right of  individual or collective self-defence” (italics added), and, also, the preparatory work 
(which expressly excluded the possibility of  preventive self-defence, vid. United Nations Con-
ference of  International Organization, vol. 11, pp. 72-73). 
39 aBi-SaaB, G., “Cours général de Droit International Public”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International de La Haye, vol. 207, 1987, pp. 9-463 (pp. 359-379); Brownlie, I.: International 
law and the use of  force by States, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963, pp. 275-278; lamBerti 
zanardi, P., La legittima difesa nel diritto internazionale, Giuffré, Milano, 1972 (pp. 191 y ss.) 
and randelzHoFer, A., op. cit., note 16, pp. 788-806. Also, corten, O.: Le droit contre la 
guerre. La interdiction du recours à la force en droit international contemporain, Pédone, Paris, 2014, p. 
665; dominicé, C., La societé international à la recherche de son équilibre. Cours Général 
de Droit International Public (2006)”, RCADI, vol. 370, 2013, p. 9-392, p. 295; Glennon, 
M. J., “The fog of  law: self-defense, inherence, and incoherence in article 51 of  the UN 
Charter”, Harvard Journal on Law and Public Policy, vol. 25, 2, 2002, pp. 539-558; p. 554; Gray, 
C., International Law and the use of  force, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008,p. 160; 
iovane, M. and de vittor, F., op. cit. nota 11, pp. 3-16 (see also the authors on the side of  
this train of  thought, cited therein) and lacHS, M., “The development and general trends 
of  international law in our time”, Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International, 1980, 
vol. 169, pp. 9-377. An overview of  the premise of  preventive self-defence, with particular 
reference to Spanish authors and their points of  view, can be consulted in coccHini, A.: 
“Intentando definir la legítima defensa preventiva”, Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional, 
vol. 34, 2018, pp. 499-524.
40 See para. 189, doc. A/59/2005, of  21 March. 
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pment, security and human rights for all” (21 March 2005)41, also admitted 
the concept against imminent attacks, although, unlike the United States, it 
rejected it in the case of  latent threats. At its meeting in 2007, the IDI stated 
the right to a State’s self-defence “arises in the event of  an armed attack in 
progress, or manifestly imminent”42. Similar conclusions were drawn in the 
Tallin Manual on cyber warfare (2013, 2017)43 and the International Law Asso-
ciation Report on Aggression (2016), although the latter stated that it was 
only acceptable where States were facing clear and actual danger of  a specific 
imminent attack”44.
If  there has been a key factor in the change of  opinion on self-defence 
against unconsummated attacks, it has been Jihad-type international terrorism 
and I would venture to say that the definitive blow was, in particular, struck 
by Da’esh’s actions. It has, in fact, been its threat which has spurred the as yet 
reluctant States to consider that self-defence was also valid if, as in the case 
of  this group, the States were under continuous threat.45 This was because 
Da’esh was not just another terrorist organisation. It controlled a significant 
amount of  territory in Iraq and Syria, it had managed to establish a pseu-
do-State under the dictates of  the most radical version of  Islam, and it never 
missed an opportunity to declare open warfare against the West.
The conviction that they could not wait to be attacked, given a threat 
of  this calibre, is also what was on the mind of  the States who agreed to 
become a part of  the International Coalition against the Islamic State which, 
since 2014, has taken action (and not just armed) against it. It should be 
41 Doc. A/59/2005, of  21 March, para. 124. 
42 IDI, 10th resolution, 27 October 2007, op.cit., note 19, para. 3. 
43 The Group of  Experts in charge of  drafting it accepted this idea although admitted that it 
is not exactly what is recognised in article 51 of  the Charter (Tallinn Manual… cit., note 19 p. 
63, norm 15, para. 2; Tallinn Manual 2.0… cit., note 19, p. 350, norm 73, para. 2). 
44 ILA, Johannesburg Conference (2016), Use of  force. Draft Report on Aggression... cit., note 20, pp. 
10-11.
45 This was revealed by Da’esh statements, for example after the Paris attacks in 2015 which 
stated: “Cette ataque n’est que le debut de la tempète et un avertissement pour ceux qui 
veulent méditer et tirer des leçons”. See weckel, P.: “La France entre en guerre contre 
le pseudo-califat”, Bulletin Sentinelle 452, 14 November 2015. And a similar message made 
public after those in March 2016 in Brussels (État Islamique, Belgique, Fash Infos, Comuniqué 
sur l’expedition bénie de Bruxelles contre la Belgique croisée, communiqué made public on 22 
March 2016). 
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remembered that, in 2014, Iraq invoked collective self-defence due to, “the 
serious threat constituted by international terrorist organisations”46. In July 
2015, Turkey justified some cross-border actions into Syria with the threats 
from terrorist groups.47 Belgium committed to air strikes, also on Syria, after 
the attacks it suffered in March 2016 (up until then it had limited itself  to 
supporting the Coalition). The United States based its intervention in Syria 
and Iraq on the constant threat from the Islamic State.48 France, traditiona-
lly more cautious about preventive self-defence, changed its conduct after a 
direct attack, admitting that it was all in line with, “the exceptional nature of  
the threat posed by Da’esh”49. The terrorist organisation also seems to have 
provoked a more understanding attitude to armed reactions to threats in the 
United Kingdom.50 It should also be remembered that resolution 2249 (2015) 
exhorted the States to take the necessary measures, “to prevent and suppress” 
(italics added) terrorist acts by Da’esh.
Therefore, it would appear that the incursion of  Da’esh has tipped the 
balance in favour of  accepting self-defence against imminent attacks. Howe-
ver, although it may seem understandable that this is so given the exception 
threat of  the calibre this terrorist group, to start to generalise it could be tric-
ky and dangerous. There are, nonetheless, States that seem to be comfortable 
using this argument for other terrorist organisations. For example, Turkey 
(January 2018) did so when attacking the region of  Afrin, which was under 
Kurdish control but in Iraqi territory, alleging the “terrorist threat” involved 
in PKK actions and, it specified, it was also acting given the Syrian govern-
ment’s lack of  control in the region.51 However, there are many more States, 
46 Doc. S/2014/695.
47 The New York Times, 24 July 2015 (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/world/europe/
turkey-isis-syria-airstrikes.html).
48 Doc. S/2014/695, 23 September 2014. 
49 See its intervention in the Council meeting where resolution 2249 (2015) was passed: doc. 
S/PV.7565, 20 November 2015, p. 2. See also alaBrune, F., op. cit.,note 22, p. 46.
50 This has been felt in various quarters. For example, on 27 April 2016, the House of  Com-
mons published its second report The Government’s policy on the use of  drones for targeted killing, 
Second Report Session 2015-16, (HC 574, HL Paper 2016, p. 43, para. 3.24; see also p. 45) in 
which it recognised the existence of  a right to self-defence against imminent attacks. 
51 Doc. S/2018/53. See the condemnation of  the attack by A. peterS en “The Turkish Op-
eration in Afrin (Syria) and the silence of  the lambs”, EJIL Talk, 30 January 2018. 
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above all in Latin America, Africa and Asia, who are wary of  a concept that, 
without doubt, could cause problems when applied.52
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Charter of  the United Nations conceived the prohibition on the use 
of  force as an essential element for the stability of  the new international so-
ciety it created. However, article 2.4 would appear to be more a preachment 
in the desert than a present practice among States. The beginning of  the new 
century, and the challenges posed by international terrorism, have contributed 
to placing compliance with the prohibition even further in danger. In spite of  
everything, the States have made efforts to find a legal basis to justify armed 
action against terrorism and self-defence has been the most used argument.
These are new times, it seems, for self-defence, where the possibility of  
exercising it against non-state actors and against unconsummated, but immi-
nent, attacks has opened up. If, after the 2001 attacks, a trend began which 
was more open to accepting it in these cases too, the incursion of  Da’esh te-
rrorism seems to have consolidated it a little more, and has even lead to cases 
of  dubious legality (attacking the territory of  States which do not control or 
direct the terrorist organisation but, simply, are unable or unwilling to do so).
Those are, overall, debates whose conclusions are still unclear. The for-
mat for the prohibition on the use of  force and self-defence needs to be 
adapted to the circumstances of  the complex present-day world, which pose 
challenges which are very different to those existing in 1945. A new practice 
which is more generous with the limits of  the prohibition on the use of  force, 
even if  still limited, seems to have begun, but care must be taken – the securi-
ty of  the States cannot be defended at any price, or be the excuse for crossing 
the limits of  legality. It seems, therefore, that the set of  rules regulating the 
use of  force need urgent review in order to offer the States the responses 
they demand.
52 See Final Document, 17th Summit of  Heads of  State and Government of  the Non-
Aligned Movement, 17 - 18 September 2016, para. 258.34.
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